报告题目：Contract on Peer Pressure Networks
报 告 人：孙阳
报告时间： 2024年04月07日（周日）15:30-17:00
报告地点：博学楼2楼东侧I-206（高等经济研究院会议室）
主办单位：高等经济研究院
【报告人简介】
孙阳，西南财经大学副教授。2018年获新加坡国立大学经济学博士学位，主要研究方向是网络经济学、博弈论。其论文发表在International Economic Review、Journal of Economic Theory、Games and Economic Behavior、Economic Theory等学术期刊。
【内容摘要】
We study moral hazard in teams with peer pressure. Agents embedded in a social network choose effort levels while facing pressure from neighbors. Peer pressure can impose psychological costs but also motivate efforts through complementarities. The principal designs linear contracts based on all outputs to maximize total surplus. The combination of peer pressure and moral hazard creates congestion effects between indirectly connected agents, as in Currarini et al. (2017). We characterize the optimal contract and equilibrium outcomes. Own-performance wage sensitivities and efforts are sums of weighted Katz-Bonacich centralities. Whether pressure leads to overwork or underwork depends on peer effects strength and the agent’s location. Comparative statics on network structure identify the key agent whose absence causes the largest surplus loss. Given density, nested split structures maximize surplus when psychological cost of peer pressure is relatively low. The tradeoff between psychological costs and strategic complements limits optimal network density. Finally, we characterize optimal psychotherapy extending Galeotti et al. (2020) to games with congestion effects.
【更多信息】
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撰稿：王杰 审核：胡蓉 单位：高等经济研究院
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